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is attributed to have initiated “expanding the universe of objects accepted as legitimate algebraic en-
tities” (p. 17), the author claims that he “championed the expanding universe only with reservations”
(p. 24). And further: “Western algebraists (after Cardano) did not immediately or, over the next century,
unequivocally embrace the expanding algebraic universe” (p. 24). Oughtred and Harriot, the two English
pioneers, have to be described as perpetuating Viète’s “hesitancy about the expanding algebraic universe”
(p. 40), as they all rejected negative quantities. How can the universe be expanded when the driving forces
were hesitant to do so, to say the least? Again, Wallis is ranked among those with “no full commitment to
the expanding universe of algebra” (p. 56), since “the negative and imaginary numbers were anomalies
in Wallis’s theory” (p. 230).
The “expanding universe” is an alleged process of abstract character which occurs outside the human
actors or without their doing, since it already implies using processes’ outcomes as the measurement
standard. It is all the more abstract as the second methodological problem it raises is to imply linearity
in historical development. At the very beginning of the work, the author is herself puzzled by the “many
different twists on algebra” uncovered and concludes: “British algebra did not develop in a fundamentally
linear version” (p. 3). Pycior’s own vision of conceptual development seems to be a rather continuist one,
so that she hastens to affirm, “This is not to say that there was no linear development,” without explaining,
however, these two conflicting assertions. Including the study of the second half of the 18th century in the
book as well would have facilitated not only exploring the nonlinear character of some of the foundational
debates, but also examining the differentiation between “quantity” and “number” as a means to clarify
the nature of negative and imaginary numbers.
A further intruiging dimension of the study is that it assumes a national specificity of conceptual
developments in mathematics. The author attributes to the group of mathematicians studied that they were
“sharing a national identity” (p. 3)—an identity which went so far as to take, for example for Wallis, the
form of a “national chauvinism” (p. 128). It would have been very rewarding if the author had reflected
more explicitly on this dimension of national specificity, say, by comparing it to other national cases.
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A distinguished logician and proof theorist gathers together here 13 of his more general articles published
over two decades. Some corrections and updating have been effected; one article has been split in two.
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Several repetitions and overlaps (though not all) have been removed, and the references placed together
into a bibliography at the end of the book, along with an index and a list of all the symbols.
The topics covered include the relationship between formal logic and mathematics, especially arith-
metic and set theory, and the role and uses of axiomatization. In addition, the third chapter contains
an appraisal of the philosophy of mathematics espoused by Georg Pólya and Imre Lakatos, where the
dynamics between proof and theorem is the main concern. While the author expounds his distrust of Pla-
tonism and doubts over the high status granted to set theory, overall he gives a good and fair impression
of various modern philosophical stances on the issues treated.
From the historical point of view, there is some material on Georg Cantor, Richard Dedekind, Ernst
Zermelo, and L.E.J. Brouwer, but the main focus falls upon Kurt Gödel. The author is the chief editor
of this publisher’s edition of the writings of Gödel, and chapters 6 and 8 are reprints of two of his
contributions to it.
In addition, some attention is given to David Hilbert and members of his school, especially Hermann
Weyl. An important historical detail can be added to chapter 12, which recounts the evolution of Weyl’s
philosophical attachment to a version of Brouwer’s intuitionism. In 1909, when Weyl was writing his
doctoral dissertation on integral equations under Hilbert’s direction, Henri Poincaré visited Göttingen
and gave several lectures. One of them dealt with foundations of mathematics, where Poincaré rehearsed
his view that impredicative definitions should be banned from mathematics so that paradoxes could be
avoided [Poincaré, 1910]. Weyl attended this lecture, which must have played a role in his own later
concern with impredicativity. His presence is recorded by another member of the audience, the Polish
logician Leon Chwistek, a foreign visitor to Göttingen at the time, who was also to be influenced by the
lecture in his own handling of impredicativity [Chwistek, 1948, 78–79].
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